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Abstract 
 The ethnic, sectarian, and political conflicts in Iraq and Syria serve as 
significant catalysts for Turkey’s Ja’faris to redefine their social identity. 
This article comprises a sociological analysis of the Ja’fari community who 
are predominantly Azeri Turks adhering to the Shiite sect. The article 
addresses the parameters they pursue in order to construct and position their 
own social identity in light of the developments in foreign and domestic 
politics in Turkey where the Sunni population constitutes the quantitative 
and political majority. Since the foundation of the secular Republic up until 
today, the establishment has pursued the policy of homogenizing citizens via 
its ideological apparatus based on Sunni Islam references. As a response, 
Ja’faris have been rebuilding their identity in tandem with the social changes. 
In order to integrate with the national policies and overcome the barriers that 
arise from sectarian differences, Ja’faris constantly underscore in the public 
sphere that they are the founding components of the nation as “Turks” and 
“Muslim”s. However, Turkey’s foreign and domestic politics during the 
conflicts in Iraq, and particularly in the post-Syrian crisis has engendered, 
citing the Ja’fari leader’s own words, a “shocking effect” within the Ja’fari 
community. Given the new state of affairs, Ja’faris are rebuilding the Ja’fari 
identity using a dual language: On one hand, they continue to highlight the 
“superior” Turkish and Muslim identity that is embraced by the unofficial 
state ideology, and on the other hand, they embark on a quest for a more 
civilian equal citizenship within social movements. 
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Introduction: 
 The civil war that has been going on in recent years in Turkey’s 
neighboring countries Iraq and Syria, has evolved into a Shi’ite-Sunni40  
“sectarian war”41. The conflict between Sunni and Shi’ite communities 
concerns the countries in the region as well as the sectarian communities 
living in those countries.  
 Though the intensity and outcomes may be different from those in 
Iraq and Syria, sectarian conflict is not an unfamiliar concept for Turkey, 
which is a country with a heterogeneous social structure. Particularly the 
Alawi42  (Alawi jurisprudence is deemed the heterodox interpretation of 
Shi’ite sect, yet despite some common religious beliefs, Alawis and Ja’faris 
have very different religious practices) pogroms43 in various provinces of 
Turkey in the last quarter of 1970’s linger in the collective memory of 
sectarian minorities. Therefore, the Shi’ites in Turkey closely follow the 
developments in the Middle East, and reconstruct their sense of belonging as 
citizens on the basis of the discourse generated by the political power, as 
well as the symbols they use and the decisions they take.  
 The majority of the Shi’ite population in Turkey is Sunni Muslims. 
Their visibility in the public space has increased since the 1980’s, through 
internal dynamics such as the empowerment of identity movements, rise of 
pan-Islamism, urbanization, efficient use of the media, as well as external 
dynamics that have emerged as a result of the political and social 
developments in the Middle East geography (Iran Islamic Revolution, 
                                                          
40 There are two main sects in Islam: Sunni and Shi'ite. The demographic breakdown 
between the two denominations is difficult to assess and varies by source. According to 
PEW Research Center, “Of the total Muslim population, 10-13% are Shia Muslims and 87-
90% are Sunni Muslims. Most Shias (between 68% and 80%) live in just four countries: 
Iran, Pakistan, India and Iraq”. (Mapping the Global Muslim Population, 2009: 9-10) 
41 Ali Bulaç defines religious and sectarian conflict as “positioning a religious or sectarian 
group as the enemy or fighting against it solely on the basis of their religious beliefs or 
practices, or a different interpretation of the religion within the same religion and the 
religious practices based on such interpretation”  (Bulaç, 2006). Although the tension in the 
Middle East stems from the effort to expand the sphere of political influence; there is a 
rising toll of news coverage from the region regarding attacks, arson, murders and massacre 
solely because of people’s sectarian beliefs. Cf. (Nordland and Rubin, 2014 : Fire erupts at 
Shiite Mosque in Istanbul amid threats to community, 2014). 
42 Alawis emerged as a result of the Shi’ite origin insurgencies in the 16th century. 
(Bozarslan, 2010: 201) 
43 More than 200 people got killed and hundreds of people- most of whom were Alawis- 
were wounded during attacks mainly aimed at Alawi neighborhoods in Malatya (April 18, 
1978), Maraş  (December 24, 1978) and Çorum (May 29, 1980). On July 2, 1993, thousands 
of people besieged and set fire on a hotel where an Alawi association had organized a 
festival. 33 writers, poets and artists and 2 staff present at the hotel at the time of the 
incident were killed, while 51 intellectuals who could escape by their own means were 
heavily wounded (Şahhüseyinoğlu, 2012). 
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invasion of Iraq, Arab Spring, etc.). The visibility in the political and social 
sphere has brought to the agenda the discussion of the problem areas 
regarding citizenship that the Shi’ite community experiences due to state 
policies. The article analyzes the reconstruction of the sense of belonging 
and citizenship across the Azeri-origin Ja’faris of Turkey44, adherents of the 
Ja’fari jurisprudence of the Shi’ite Islamic faith, which is also the official 
sect of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 In this study, Azeri-origin Ja’faris were selected as an authentic 
community adhering to a particular ethnic and political stance within the 
Orthodox Shi’a jurisprudence. The political and sociological literature on 
Azeri Ja’faris is scarce. Three methods were followed for an analysis of how 
the Ja’faris built their own identity vis-à-vis the state and government 
policies. First, a field study was conducted in Istanbul, Halkalı, a 
neighborhood that is densely populated with Shi’ites of the Ja’fari school. 
Towards the end of 1970’s, there was a flurry of immigrants to the 
neighborhood from provinces such as Kars and Iğdır, which are heavily 
populated with Ja’faris of Azeri45 origin. The neighborhood houses the 
largest Ja’fari mosque in Istanbul as well as a cultural complex under 
construction. The neighborhood was visited 3 times during June 2012- July 
2014 period.  Following the snowball method, interviews were held with 10 
Ja’fari individuals from various economic, social, and age groups. The 
interviews helped keep pulse of the community and understand the 
experiences and problems of Ja’fari individuals as citizens of the Republic of 
Turkey. No recording device was used to enable the participants to talk 
comfortably on the sensitive issue of identity and to gain their trust; only 
notes were taken. Furthermore, the Valide Han Mosque in Istanbul, the 
mosque of Ja’faris of Iranian origin, was visited, and an interview was held 
with Mehmet Kıtay, the religious officer of the mosque. Based on an 
evaluation of the impressions of the community members and review of the 
literature, interviews were held with Selahattin Özgündüz, the leader of 
Ja’faris in Turkey who played an active role in the organization and identity 
                                                          
44 The phrase  “Azeri Ja’faris” in this text refers to “Ja’faris of Azeri origin who live in 
Turkey. 
45 The mass of the Oghuz who crossed the Amu Darya towards the west left the Iranian 
plateau, which remained Persian, and established themselves more to the west, in Anatolia. 
Here they divided into Ottomans, who were Sunni and settled, and Turkmens, who were 
nomads and in part Shiite (or, rather, Alawi). The latter were to keep the name 'Turkmen' for 
a long time: from the thirteenth century onwards they 'Turkised' the Iranian populations of 
Azerbaijan (who spoke west Iranian languages such as Tat, which is still found in residual 
forms), thus creating a new identity based on Shiism and the use of Turkish. These are the 
people today known as Azeris." (Roy, 2007 :6) 
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movement of the Ja’fari community; and Kasım Alcan, the Director of 
Zeynebiye Social and Cultural Events. The main axis of the interviews was 
the relations between the Ja’fari community and the state, and Turkey’s 
Middle East policy, as factors that determine the reconstruction of the Ja’fari 
identity. Lastly, Ja’fari news sites were scanned for news coverage during 
2012-2014 for an analysis of the controversial views and statements of 
Ja’fari leaders from different regions of Turkey. Using the methods 
mentioned above, the study identified how Azeri Turks in Turkey form a 
minority sectarian identity via the leaders of the Ja’fari community within 
the context of Islam.  
 
SECT AND IDENTITY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF 
INTEGRATION THEORIES 
 Religion assumes an important function in forging an identity, 
identifying the boundaries and roles of the community members, protecting 
them against external threats, and forming the “other” concept. One of the 
founding fathers of sociology, Emile Durkheim, and scientists such as 
Talcott Parsons and Robert Bellah that followed, emphasized the role of 
religion in society within the framework of integration theories. According to 
Durkheim’s functional analysis, religion assumes 3 main functions in the 
sustainability of a society: Social solidarity, social control, contributing a 
meaning and goal to one’s life (Durkheim, 2003). However, not always does 
religion play a role that reinforces the notion of social cohesion in society as 
underscored by Durkheim. Therefore, as noted by Parson’s student Robert K. 
Merton, this necessitates making a distinction between functions and 
dysfunctions (Merton, 1968). As opposed to functions, when dysfunctions 
arise, this disrupts the cohesion and harmony between religion and other 
social phenomena, giving rise to social problems. A religion that emerges 
within the same community or a religion that is present simultaneously in the 
same community, or a different religious interpretation burgeoning from the 
same religion, may lead to the disintegration of social cohesion, and turn 
solidarity into conflict and control into rebellion. This condition of 
dysfunction, in its most severe form, manifests itself as religious and 
sectarian wars.  
 “In religious and sectarian wars, the religious interpretation or 
practices of the targeted religion or sect are not included within law. That 
group is deprived of the right to live. It is either forced to surrender its faith 
and religious practices or suppressed. As observed frequently, it is subjected 
to mass destruction” (Ali Bulaç, 2006). Although it is the economic and 
political interests of those in power that is in the background, the parties that 
build their legitimacy and discourse on the basis of religious arguments 
attack sacred monuments during times of conflict; they inflict damage, 
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massacre the members of the religious faith that they deem the enemy, and 
above all, they torture the leading figures of that faith.  
 The Crusades that lasted for about 200 years between Christians and 
Muslims may serve as an example of the struggle between two different 
religious communities. Meanwhile, the 30 Years War (1618-1648), 
essentially a Catholic-Protestant conflict that occurred on the European 
continent, was one of the most violent sectarian wars in history, whereby 
most of the warring states had economic and political goals on their agenda 
(Pages, 1991).  
 A conflict caused by dysfunction ruptures the social bonds among 
people from various religious and sectarian groups, while it weaves novel 
networks of solidarity among people of the same religion or sect. It increases 
social cohesion, and leads to a restructuring of a solid religious identity and a 
sense of belonging. The German-origin American sociologist Lewis Coser 
who studies the functions of social conflicts states that external “conflict sets 
boundaries between groups within a social system by strengthening group 
consciousness and awareness of separateness, thus establishing the identity 
of groups within the system”  (Coser, 1956: 34). In his analysis of social 
conflict he also argues “external conflict can often strengthen a group. It 
makes group members conscious of their identity by introducing a strong 
‘negative reference group’ to which they contrast themselves; it also 
increases their participation” (Wallece and Wolf, 1995: 157). For instance, 
throughout the European history, Christians have condemned Jews over and 
over again for centuries due to their religious beliefs. They have been 
outcast, suppressed, isolated, banished or massacred. This physical and 
symbolic violence forged unique networks of solidarity among Jewish 
communities, while leading to the reconstruction and rebuilding of the 
Jewish identity (see Levine, 2001; Sand, 2009). 
 A new version (see Hass, 2014) of the extremely violent sectarian 
wars of Europe in the 17th century has been persisting in the Middle Eastern 
Islamic geography for the last 30 years. In the beginning of the 20th century, 
the Sunni-Shi’ite relations continued in harmony against common enemies 
(secular attacks on Islam in the form of imperialism, colonial occupations 
(Batatu, 1978: 173) and the Israeli “threat”), took on a new dimension 
particularly in the wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran (Nasr, 2006: 
106). During the first years of the new Islamic regime and ensuing the 
occupation of Iraq by the USA, there was an attempt to strengthen its 
presence in the region, and a project to create an anti-Western, anti-Israeli 
Shi’ite crescent in the geography with a Shi’ite majority, such as Azerbaijan, 
Bahrain, Iraq, and Lebanon, and in countries like Syria, Turkey, Yemen, and 
Afghanistan where they represented a minority. In response to this foreign 
policy move, the Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey-Western axis defiance and the 
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attempts to create their own sphere of influence, tensed up the Sunni-Shi’ite 
relations in the region (Güneş, 2013 : 52-55). In addition to the tension 
between countries with diverse sectarian majorities, and the struggle to 
create a political sphere of influence, “those in power deprive the different 
sectarian and ethnic groups of their Constitutional rights and freedoms 
(Ayhan, 2012) conferred to them on the basis of equal citizenship, causing 
problems such as sectarian civil wars, conflicts, tension, and disruption of the 
sense of citizenship” in individual countries. Especially the new political 
balance or unbalance following the US occupation and the democratization 
demands that have transformed into a sectarian conflict in Syria evoke 
excitement in the Sunni and Shi’ite communities that live in the countries of 
that region and causes them to reconstruct their sense of citizenship in line 
with the policies that their respective governments pursue regarding the 
matter. Given this context, in the “secular” Republic of Turkey where Sunni 
Islam exists as a social identity beyond a mere religious practice (Zubaida, 
2000), which is a development that is recently observed to have its 
reflections in foreign policy as well, Shi’ite Ja’fari “minority” becomes more 
visible in the public sphere, and voices its demands more forcefully as an 
identity movement. Consequently, in the social sphere, Ja’faris are redefining 
the identity that they have been building since the foundation of the 
Republic.  
 
JA’FARI JURISPRUDENCE AS AN IDENTITY IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL PLATFORM 
 Ja’fari jurisprudence is a school of fiqh whereby Shi’ites constitute 
the majority. It is derived of Ja’far as-Sadiq, the 6th Shi’a imam. The Ja’fari 
jurisprudence is followed by Twelvers46  and  Ismailis (sevener) in general, 
as well as a small minority of Zaidis (fiver, the second largest branch of Shia 
Islam),  a  group called Zaidi Wasītīs. Turkish Shi’ites, just like Iranian, 
official sect of Islamic Republic, belong to the Ja’fari tradition. Despite the 
ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences between Turkey’s Shi’ites, those in 
Iran and the rest of the Shi’ite world, there are bonds that go beyond these 
differences, national boundaries and identities (transnational). When a Shi’ite 
                                                          
46 “The so-called Twelvers (ithna ‘ashari), like other Shi‘ite sects, believe that ‘Ali was the 
rightful successor to the leadership of the community of believers after the death of the 
Prophet Muhammad. But what makes the Twelvers distinct from others is the belief that 
there were a total of twelve Imams, all descendants of ‘Ali and his wife, Fatimah (the 
daughter of the Prophet), each designated by the previous one, and that the last Imam, the 
young Imam al-Mahdi, went into occultation and will reappear shortly be- fore Judgment 
Day. Until the day he reappears, the Shi‘ite community will be in need of guidance.” 
Shaery-Eisenlohd, 2008: X) 
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chooses his ‘marja al-Taklid’47  (source of imitation), he is not interested in 
the national, ethnic or linguistic identity of the imam. The Shi’ite world does 
not have only one source of imitation as a mujtahid (the independent legal 
thinker). A Shi’ite chooses any mujtahid as a guide, and none of them is 
viewed as superior to the other. The marja al-Taklid that Turkey’s Ja’faris 
adhered to in religious matters for a very long time was Ayatollah Mirza 
Jawad Tabrizi from Iraq. Tabrizi was an Azeri Turk. After his demise in 
November 2006 at the age of 82, the Shi’ites of Turkey in general selected 
the Iran-born Hüssein Vahid Horasani as their marja al-Taklid, and the Iran-
born Ayatollah Ali Sistani who has been living in Iraq since 1951 (such as 
the Iraqi Turkmens who are Shi’ites by 75%), as their guide  (K.Alcan, 
personal communication, 25 July 2014).  
 Turkey’s Ja’faris are in close relations with other Shi’ite countries 
due to the transnational network structure of Shi’ia. However, before 
religious belonging, they emphasize the Turkish identity that they are 
affiliated with via ethnic and citizenship ties:  
“By whose side do we stand? In terms of our sect, we are similar 
with Iran, yet our national state is the Turkish state. Azeris, who 
are not citizens of Turkey, view Turkey as their second homeland. 
And they do not call us Iranian, they call us Azeris; of Azerbaijani 
origin.” (S. Özgündüz, personal communication 27 June, 2012). 
 Indeed, although religion and sect are important factors that 
determine identity; other elements such as nationality, race, language, and 
culture are the inseparable parts and important components of the identity. 
As seen in the 8-year-long Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988) in the Middle East, the 
Arab Shi’ites that constitute the majority in Iraq have fought against Iran as 
Arab nationalists under the regime of the Sunni Saddam Hussein. 
 
THE SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE OF THE JA’FARI 
JURISPRUDENCE 
 The population of Turkey today is about seventy-seven six million48, 
of which ninety-nine percent are at least nominally registered Muslims. 
                                                          
47 “Authority to be followed. Highest-ranking authorities of the Twelver Shi’ite community 
that practice shariah. The term is usually applied to between four and eight high-ranking 
jurists (ayatollahs) locally or nationally; on the world scale, it is applied to only one or two 
jurists. The position is informally acquired and depends on patterns of loyalty and allegiance 
and the perceived conduct of the jurist. Two major ayatollahs holding this status after 1970 
were Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khoi . Their followers included 
most Arabic-speaking Shiis in Iraq, the Gulf states, Lebanon, and Syria, and the majority of 
Shiis in India, Pakistan, East Africa, and Iran.” (Esposito, 203:192). 
48 According to the Results of Address Based Population Registration System, 2013 The 
population of Turkey became 76 667 864 on December 31, 2013. (TurkStat, 2014)  
 
European Scientific Journal February 2015 edition vol.11, No.5 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
332 
However in official documents there is no statistics about the sectarian or 
cult links of the Muslim population. Therefore, the rate of Sunni groups or 
Shi’ites (Ja’faris, Nusayris (Alawites), Alawis) within the general population 
is not known for sure. Various institutions and organizations cite various 
figures. For instance, according to the Turkey section of the International 
Religious Freedom Report issued by the US Department of State annually, 
there are approximately 500.000 Ja’faris living in Turkey (Department of 
State, The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 2012: 2). 
Selahattin Özgündüz, who is referred to as Hujjat al-Islam-proof of Islam 
and Sheikh of the Muslims, and is acknowledged as the leader by the 
majority of Turkey’s Ja’faris, asserts that this figure reaches around 3 
million:  
“It has been noted in the minutes of the Assembly that there are 
around 3 million Azeri Ja’faris, based on the declaration of the 
former Minister of Culture Namık Kemal Zeybek who spoke at 
the Assembly regarding the law of mosques passed in 1998. 
Although almost all of them are Turkish citizens, they are Turks 
of Azerbaijani origin” (personal communication, 27 June 2012). 
  However, in his article titled “The geographical distribution and 
estimated population of Islam-based sects in the Middle East”, Büyükkara 
(2013) notes that the actual figure is much lower than 3 million. He asserts 
that this figure may be slightly above half a million, taking into account the 
pre-migration and the current population in settlement areas predominantly 
inhabited by the Ja’faris (332). Based on the data from the “Research on 
Religious Life in Turkey”, commissioned by the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs and conducted by TurkStat, 1% of the population in Turkey is of 
Ja’fari jurisprudence. In other words, there are 760.000 members of the 
Ja’fari sect living in Turkey. Ja’fari population mostly lives in the Northern 
Anatolia Region of Turkey. In this region, the members of the Ja’fari sect 
constitute 4,6% of the total population. Quantitatively speaking, the most 
crowded city where Ja’faris live is Istanbul, the city of Turkey that receives 
the highest number of immigrants. 2.1% of the 14 million population in 
Istanbul are Ja’faris49  (Research on Religious Life in Turkey, 2014: 8). 
 The Ja’fari population in Turkey may be analyzed under four groups. 
The first is the Azeri-origin Ja’faris that represent almost the entirety of 
Turkey’s Ja’faris. They live in the North East of Turkey for the most part, 
along the border of Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, in the provinces of 
Kars, Ardahan, Iğdır, Ağrı and Erzurum (Bulut, 2004: 87). Nevertheless, the 
people of the region have migrated heavily from rural to urban areas due to 
                                                          
49 The research does not include information about Alawis that make up the largest religious 
minority in Turkey and are cited within Shi’ia heterodoxy.   
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daunting economic and safety concerns. Especially in 1950-1960 and 1980-
1990’s, the people of the region have migrated to various metropolitan cities 
across Turkey, such as Istanbul, Ankara, İzmir, and Bursa. Today, in 
addition to these provinces, cities such as Bursa, Aydın, Manisa, Çorum and 
Kocaeli accommodate Ja’fari people and their places of worship as well 
(Üzüm, 1994: 84–92.) Ja’faris of Azeri-origin have around 30 mosques and 
masjids in Istanbul and about 300 across Turkey.  
 Azeri Ja’faris principally include Alawis and Nusayris (Arabic 
Alawis) as Ja’faris. These communities are estimated to represent 
approximately 7 to 15% of the population in Turkey. Özgündüz explicates 
this demographic calculation as follows: 
 “In general, Ja’fari community is merely perceived as the Azeri 
Ja’faris. However, there are more than 20 million Alawis living in 
Turkey, and about 2 million Alawi Nusayris in the south of 
Turkey, in Hatay, Adana, and Mersin provinces. If were to ask 
them what their sect is, they would tell you that they are Ja’faris. 
The Ja’fari population reaches some 25 million in total”. 
(personal communication, 27 June 2012) 
 Although there are some common beliefs across Ja’faris and the 
Alawis and Nusayris (adoration of imam Ali and ehl-i Beyet and twelve 
imam), there are significant distinctions regarding their religious practices 
and political stance (Massicard, 2005: 361). In practice, all Ja’faris are Azeri 
Turks, whereas about 80% of Alawis are Turkmen clans and the rest are 
Kurds and Zazas. Nusayris, on the other hand, are of Arabic origin. Ja’faris 
are generally part of nationalist right political entities, whereas Turkey’s 
Alawis generally support leftist political entities.  Yet, Turkey’s Alawis do 
not exhibit a monolithic structure (Bilici, 1998), since some of them define 
themselves as Ja’faris (7,46%) or Shi’a (2,8%) (Aktaş, 1999: 461) while 
some others adopt the Shi’ite belief. For example, in the Çorum province of 
Central Anatolia, a group of Alawis parted with the “heterodox way” in the 
aftermath of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. They adopted the Ja’fari sect and 
opened their own mosques50 .  
 The third group of Ja’faris in Turkey includes those that have chosen 
the Shi’ite fiqh over time, although their family may be of Sunni origin. 
                                                          
50 The leader of the congregation is Teoman Şahin, the son of the former SHP (Social 
Democratic Populist Party) MP Cemal Şahin. During the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, 
Şahin was a student at the School of Law in Ankara University. He was impressed by the 
Iranian Revolution and switched from Alawi jurisprudence to the Ja’fari sect of Shi’ia. In 
1987, the father and the son founded the Ehl-i Beyt Mosque in Çorum. Today, the mosque 
has a congreation of around 1000. (Erdoğan, 2007) 
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Although there is no statistics regarding the number of followers from this 
group, it is estimated that they are very few in number (Albayrak, 2008). 
 A fourth group within the Shi’ites of Turkey are Iranians, who settled 
in Istanbul in the 18th and 19th centuries, though their population has 
dwindled significantly over time (Zarcone, 2007: 136). Organized around the 
Philanthropic Society of Iranians in Turkey, this community has two places 
of worship in Istanbul: One is the Iranian Valide Han Mosque on the 
European continent, and the other is the Seyid Ahmet Deresi İranlılar 
Mosque on the Asian side. Made up of Azeri-origin Iranians for the most 
part, this group is more urbanized and secular in comparison to the other 
Ja’faris who came to Istanbul at a much later stage. They experience the 
Shi’ite faith as a cultural element rather than through religious means. 
(Zarcone, 2007:138). There is no current link between this group and the 
Ja’faris of Anatolia today (M. Kınay, personal communication, 21 June 
2012). 
 The Azeri-origin Ja’faris of Turkey do not constitute a homogeneous 
group regarding their faith or worldview. This community is organized under 
various groups, publishing houses, and NGO’s such as Kevser, Zeynebiye, 
Iğdır Ehl-i Beyt Association Scholars. The largest and most efficient of these 
groups is the Zeynebiye group based in Istanbul’s Halkalı district. The 
religious scholars of this community (ahund) have undergone fiqh education 
in Iraq for the most part.  For instance, the community leader, Selahattin 
Özgündüz, and an important imam, Hamit Turan, have undergone a brief 
education in Iran and then moved to Iraq because of problems with 
residential permit. There, they underwent religion education in the city of 
Najaf (Erdoğan, 2007). However, particularly following the first Gulf War, 
the new generation attended religious education in Iran, since the Shi’ite 
madrasas in Iraq were subject to oppression.  
 As a result, the Ja’faris of Turkey engage in multidimensional 
relations with countries such as Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq and Syria that occupy 
an important space in Turkey’s foreign politics due to various dynamics such 
as ethnic elements, sectarian brotherhood, affiliation with a marja-i, taklid, 
and sacred landmarks. 
 
THE EXTERNAL WORLD OF TURKEY’S JA’FARIS 
 Support for those in power by the ethnic, religious, sectarian and 
class components that constitute the political majority within the social 
structure51   (those that have a control over the state apparatus) play an 
important role in the institution of foreign politics. An outcome of the 
                                                          
51 What we mean by political majority are those groups that are effective in the management 
of the state apparatus regardless of their rate in the total population. 
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foreign politics that is implemented upon the impact, contribution or support 
of internal dynamics, is the redefinition or reconstruction of the identities of 
those that make up the social structure inside (particularly minorities). In that 
regard, the level and dimension of relationships between the governments of 
the Republic of Turkey and the other Islamic countries in the international 
sphere, affect the reconstruction of Ja’faris’ attitude towards political 
authority and their sectarian and ethnic position as citizens.  
 Throughout the Republican history, part of the problems and tensions 
between the state and the ethnic, religious, sectarian minorities began to 
dissolve and soften up during the “conservative democratic” Justice and 
Development Party (JDP) period who put into effect legal and political 
reforms on the path to full membership to the European Union. JDP came to 
power in 2002 upon support of a huge portion of the society, and won the 
following 2 general elections increasing its votes further. Despite those 
positive developments during the JDP period, the perception and certain 
practices (particularly during the end of the 2nd and 3rd terms of the JDP 
rule) that suggested that domestic and foreign politics were under the impact 
of religious symbols and discourse, created discomfort in the Ja’fari 
community. Especially the civil war in Syria has been a breaking point 
regarding the relations between the government and the Ja’fari community. 
In fact, until 2011, JDP’s approach to foreign politics in the Middle East was 
to act as a balancing force and a mediator between the Sunni and Shi’ite 
groups. During the 2002-2011 period, Turkey extended political and 
economic support to those Shi’ite groups that tried to thwart the Israeli 
attacks against Lebanon. She has established constructive relationships with 
the Shi’ite groups in Iraq.  Since the Ottoman Empire, for the first time, a 
Sunni statesman, the Turkish Primer Minister Erdoğan, visited the tomb of 
Ali, the fourth caliph and the cousin of Prophet Muhammad, in Najaf, the 
holy city of Shi’ites (Dinçer, Coşkun and Yegin, 2011). Here, Erdoğan used 
the term “second Karbala incident” to condemn the suppression of the 
demands of the Shi’ite majority who were governed by a Sunni monarchy in 
Bahrain (Al Rashed, 2013).  There were initiatives for lifting the 
international isolation on the Assad regime and common meetings were held 
between the cabinets of the two countries. Ankara vetoed the draft resolution 
in the United Nations Security Council that stipulated sanctions against Iran 
due to nuclear activities. These policies in the international realm were 
regarded positively by the majority of the Shi’ite world, and specifically the 
Shi’ite groups in Turkey (Veysel Ayhan, 2012). However, Ankara sided with 
the Sunnis in the Sunni-Shi’ite tension in Iraq, made announcements and 
took initiatives that almost represented an intervention in Iraq’s domestic 
politics (Balcı, 2013), supported the predominantly Sunni opposition in 
Syria, and opened its doors to the NATO missile shield that aimed against 
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Iran, all of which caused tension not only between the government and the 
Shi’ite world, but also with the Ja’fari community in Turkey52.  
 That is because Turkey’s Ja’faris particularly care about three 
neighbors of Turkey that they have sectarian brotherhood ties with.  
“As the Ja’fari community, we are emotionally wounded by any 
attack targeting Iran, Iraq, or Azerbaijan. We are against any 
external intervention to the affairs of any Islamic country, but we 
exhibit a more intense reaction when it comes to those three 
countries, given our religious and sectarian bonds. It is the 
circumstances that determine such reaction” (S. Özgündüz, 
personal communication, 27 June 2012).  
 It is necessary to include Syria among those three countries, because 
Syria acts as a bridge between Iran and Lebanon, the stronghold of the 
Shi’ite organization Hizbollah, and is effective in the administration of the 
Nusayri minority. 
“We are by the side of the Syrian state and people. Take your 
hands off Syria. That is our request. Stop providing weapons, 
stop killing the Syrians.” (S. Özgündüz, personal 
communication, 27 June 2012). 
 Ja’fari leaders criticized the foreign politics pursued by the 
government during 2011-2014, and began to bring to the agenda the issues 
pertaining to their problems. As we will see in under the next chapter, in this 
new order, Ja’faris who had been defining themselves as Turks and Muslims, 
hence the “main component” in the country since the foundation of the 
Republic, embarked on a democratic struggle for the first time to earn their 
political and social rights since they fail to fully exercise those rights as 
equal citizens.  
 
EMPHASIS ON THE NOTION OF MAIN COMPONENT IN THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE JAFARI IDENTITY 
                                                          
52 Özgündüz who spoke at a TV program voiced the problem with the government’s foreign 
politics: “Mr. Prime Minister joined the Universal Aşura Mourning Ceremony last year and 
honored us. He then visited the Shrine of Prophet Ali at Najaf-ul Ashraf and had talks with 
Ayatollah Sistani. All of that generated an incredible affection towards Mr. Prime Minister 
in the Shi’a world. If this process was sustained without any damage, great things could 
have been done. This way the Syrian problem would be resolved without inflicting any harm 
on the region, and the incidents in Bahrain could be resolved through a formula that would 
not serve the Great Middle East Project. The love for the Prime Minister would contribute 
immensely to the solution of these problems. However, the attitude of our government 
regarding Syria as well as the attitude of the media circles close to the government tarnished 
that sentiment. That was how it had its repercussions in that area.” (Türkiye ve İran 
Suriye’de Çarpıştırılmak İsteniyor, 2011). 
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 The Treaty of Lausanne (1923), which is the constituent document of 
the Republic of Turkey in the international realm, had conferred minority 
status to non-Muslims living in Turkey53. However, non-Turkish Muslim 
ethnic groups such as Kurds or Circassians, or Turkish groups belonging to 
different sects of Islam such as Ja’faris, had not been conferred minority 
status. Following World War I, all Muslim nations who fought a common 
war against the occupying powers of the West were included as the main 
component of Turkey, solely on condition that they accepted the Turkish 
identity regardless of their sectarian or ethnic membership. This situation 
that came about with the Treaty of Lausanne was important in the formation 
of the Ja’fari identity of Turkey. The Azeri Ja’faris that we conducted the 
study with and that constitute the overwhelming majority of Turkey’s 
Ja’faris view themselves as the founding component of the nation as Turks 
and Muslims54. The Director of Zeynebiye Social and Cultural Events, 
Kasım Alcan defines “main component” as “the understanding that makes 
this land (Turkey) the land of Turks and Islam”. Although they are a 
sectarian minority and are subject to the homogenizing policies of the state, 
Alcan refuses being referred to as a minority: “The state may pursue 
erroneous policies but we are the essence of this state as Turks and 
Muslims”. (K. Alcan, personal communication, 25 July 2014) 
 In particular, for most of the Azeri Ja’fari community who fled from 
Caucasia and settled in Turkey due to the Russian oppression during the final 
periods of the Ottoman State or during the conflicts with the Armenians 
(Andrews and Benninghaus , 2002: 107), Turkey was the major harbor that 
they could take shelter in and sustain their presence. This historic 
background was one of the most crucial factors that guided Azeri Ja’faris to 
pursue Turkish nationalist political structures in the political realm. 
Especially in the 1970’s when political violence was at a peak, Azeri-origin 
Ja’faris sided with the state and mainly organized around the Nationalist 
Movement Party against the Kurds who were involved with leftist 
organizations in provinces such as  Kars, Iğdır, and Erzurum (Bozarslan, 
1999: 239-240). In 1990s, the right-left conflict in the region was replaced by 
the fight between Kurdish and Turkish nationalists. The Ja’fari population 
continued to embrace state policies and sided by the state against Kurdish 
                                                          
53 Religious minorities, recognized under the terms of the, monasteries, and schools, are 
regulated by a separate government agency, The Office of Foundations (Öktem, 2002: 375). 
54 The Muslim groups of Turkey are generally views as the main component of the country 
although they may not be of Turkish ethnicity or of Sunni sectarian identity. In 2004, the 
progress report issued by the EU included the terms “Alawi minority” and “Kurdish 
minority”, which saw severe protests by the members and representatives of those identities. 
(DEHP ve Aleviler: Azınlık değil, Asli unsuruz, 2004). 
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nationalism. Ja’faris see themselves as the founding component of the 
country and follow the strategy to be involved in nationalistic movements. 
This resonates with the approach of the broader Shi’ite communities of the 
Middle East in 1960’s and 70’s who wanted to be integrated with the 
national policies in their own land and the political strategy they followed in 
order to overcome the sectarian barriers in that regard (Sinkaya, 2007: 40). 
Throughout those decades, within the Middle East equation, the Shi’ite 
congregations adopted secular political doctrines in countries where they 
represented both a quantitative and political minority55  (Glave, 2005: 98-99) 
and steered towards Arab nationalism. Within this context, Turkey’s Ja’faris 
removed sect-related differences from their discourse as much as possible, 
and emphasized the common ethnic element of being Turkish, thus seeking 
full integration with the Turkish society and state. 
 Although Ja’faris see themselves as the founding component of the 
Turkish State, their failure to fully integrate with the state policies 
historically is due to the efficient role that Islam’s Sunni interpretation plays 
in the functioning of the state and its politics. As underlined by Ocak  (2003), 
Sunni Islam, which is institutionalized among Turks, rests in the center of the 
state policy (60-63). In particular, following the rule of Selim I who enabled 
the transfer of caliphate from Memluks to the Ottomans (1517), the Ottoman 
State’s ideological ascendancy was institutionalized by imposing Sunni 
orthodoxy (Jacoby, 2004: 30). This marked a breaking point, after which 
being a Sunni Muslim turned out to be more valuable than being a Turk who 
follows another faith or sect. The massacres56 against the Shi’ites and 
Turkmen Alawis (Qizilibash) who were regarded as heretics broke out 
during the reign of Ottoman Sultan, Selim 1 (1512-1520). Referring to those 
massacres that led to the death of ten thousands of those people; Özgündüz 
asserts, “Through history, it was the Turks who suffered most due to the 
practices of the state …The state suppressed Turks throughout history. 
Particularly, starting with the rule of Selim I...”. During the transition from 
the multicultural and multiethnic Ottoman State to the secular Republic of 
Turkey, Sunni Islam gained a central position in the DNA of the state. In the 
USA, the group that dominates the political system and the state is 
                                                          
55 What is meant by political minority is that although a group may represent the quantitative 
majority in a geography, they do not have a say in the administration of political powers or 
do not participate in the political arena. 
56 In Anatolia, there was religious support for the eradication of Shi’ite and Turkmen Alevis. 
Mehmed Ebussuud Efendi, who used to be the sheikh-el-Islam during the rule of Suleiman 
the Magnificent and Sultan Selim II had given fatwas, including, "The lives and property of 
the Quizilbash are halal; the highest level of martyrdom is dying in a war against them”, and 
“Animals sacrificed by the Quizilbash are deemed impure and may not be eaten”. (Düzdağ, 
1972: 109-117) 
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sociologically defined as WASP (White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant). In a 
similar vein, in the Republic of Turkey, the sociological counterpart of that is 
a Turkish, Muslim, Sunni and Hanafi origin. Though belonging to another 
identity different from those origins may support the primary structure of the 
political regime, such as in the example of Alawis (see Massicard, 2002), 
they have been viewed as a potential threat by the establishment, kept under 
control, and categorized as the inner enemy by certain organs such as the 
National Security Council, the body that establishes national politics.  
 Since the foundation of the Republic, those who run the state have 
seen the ethnic and sectarian differentiation within the Muslim community as 
a potential threat against the security and continuity of the state, and 
attempted at homogenizing those groups by using the ideological and 
pressure apparatus depending on the times and the prevailing trends57. The 
Presidency of Religious Affairs is financed by the taxes collected from each 
citizen regardless of their religious or sectarian differences, the official Radio 
and Television organization that develops and broadcasts religious programs, 
the Ministry of National Education that offers compulsory religion 
education58, have served as the most important instruments in re-production 
and internalization of the Sunni state policies in the society. As the Sunni 
identity becomes more consolidated in the society through such institutions, 
there is an attempt to assimilate other faith groups in line with Sunnism. 
Furthermore, Muslim groups that do not adhere to the Sunni faith have been 
deprived of the opportunity to build and generate their own religious and 
cultural organizations.  For instance, none of the prayer houses for the 
Ja’faris enjoy legal status, and there is no budget allocated to their prayer 
houses. In Turkey, there is no legal educational institution to raise religious 
functionaries in line with the Ja’fari faith. All of the religious programs on 
state radio and TV channels are produced in accordance with the Sunni faith. 
Since the ID card of Ja’fari students bears the statement “Muslim”, at school 
they are subject to compulsory religious education curriculum developed in 
accordance with the Sunni faith.  
                                                          
57 Sevres Paranoia refers to the fear of the elites of the Republic of Turkey who are 
concerned about the repetition of the failure of Sevres Peace Treaty. This Treaty stipulated 
the fragmentation of a wide portion of the territory of the Ottoman Empire, which was 
defeated in World War I. The founders and intellectuals of the Republic believed that it was 
the ethnic and religious differentiation that caused this process, and enacted the 
homogenizing nation-state project based on this concern (Kieser, 2006: 232). 
58 One year after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the military junta that took over the 
administration in Turkey passed the 1982 Constitution. Religion education, which was 
previously selective, was made compulsory from elementary school to high school. 
(Alasania and Gelovani, 2011: 42) 
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 Though they do not fully enjoy equal and democratic rights as 
citizens, particularly prior to the migration from the rural to the urban areas, 
Ja’faris have never claimed equal citizenship rights in the public space. 
However, urbanization, creation of their own civil organizations 
(associations, media networks, cultural centers, foundations) and new social 
developments in the world and in Turkey that are shaped around the notion 
of identity have caused an important shift in the dynamics of the Ja’fari 
community. 
 Ja’faris who previously organized around the association of building 
and sustaining mosques in the civil society arena established the Association 
for the Promotion, Research and Education of Ja’fari Faith in 2006. The local 
court ruled it illegal to establish “a religion-based association” and decided 
to close down the Ja’fari Association Ja’fari-Der. However, the Supreme 
Court reversed the judgment within the scope of the new law on associations 
enacted in 2004.  By 2014, the number of NGO’s belonging to the Ja’fari 
community exceeds 20. (Taştekin, 2014) 
 At a time when civil society understanding ascended among Ja’faris, 
the work around a new “democratic” Constitution had begun in Turkey. In 
tandem with that development, Alawis, the Roma, and then for the first time 
Ja’faris held a Workshop with the participation of 117 religious and opinion 
leaders in March, 2010, where they identified their problems as citizens. 
What rendered this Workshop important was the strategic change that the 
Ja’fari community exhibited with regard to announcing and negotiating their 
problems. Prior to that date, they used to have one-on-one talks to discuss 
their problems with the state authorities when they could59.  At this 
Workshop, they shared the problems that hindered full integration with the 
Turkish society for the first time, and submitted a report to the government 
regarding this issue. The report included the following statements: 
Ja’faris want to be able to speak about their community on 
Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, or, and other mass-
media outlets. They also demand that the state not intervene with 
their mosques, the management of their Koran classes and the 
property of those institutions. Though Ja’faris do not want to be 
governed under the framework of the Affairs Directorate. They 
ask to receive a share of the payment allocated from the state 
                                                          
59 In 1998, the Government led by Mesut Yılmaz issued a decree that called for the transfer 
of all mosques, including Ja’fari mosques, to the Presidency of Religious Affairs. Selahattin 
Özgündüz held talks with the government officers in Ankara, halting this process for Ja’fari 
mosques. Özgündüz said, “In accordance with the good will agreement signed at the Prime 
Ministry, the state does not “harass” the Shi’ite community”. (Personal communication, 27 
June, 2012). 
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budget for religious affairs. They also want texts prepared by the 
community to be included in schoolbooks (Turkish Shia 
Organizes Workshop, 2010). 
 JDP sent the first signal that it would respond positively to the equal 
citizenship demands of Ja’faris regarding their identity. The same year, in 
December, Recep Tayyip Erdogan became the first Turkish Prime Minister 
who attended a ceremony in Istanbul's Halkalı district to mourn the Karbala 
tragedy that took place 1,370 years ago. Delivering a speech at the 
ceremony, Erdoğan said: "This is our mourning. We are all first-class 
citizens in this country" (Aşure Türk Basınında Geniş Yer Aldı, 2010). In 
2010, the positive relations between the government and the Ja’fari 
community60  and the positive signs that the problems would be resolved was 
swept away by a taut process marked with changes in the domestic and 
foreign politics landscape. As the axis of balance that Turkey maintained 
between the Shi’ites and the Sunnis in its Middle East policy shifted towards 
the Sunnis, and the sectarian discourse and perceptions ascended in domestic 
politics, Turkey’s Ja’faris engaged in an overt criticism of the government 
for the first time.  
“We, the seculars, were suppressed when we were in power (...). 
Now, they provoke people against us on a daily basis. You were 
the ones who said yesterday that all Muslims were brothers and 
that the seculars tried to set us against each other.” (Friday 
Sermon of Özgündüz, 2014).  
 During anti-government protests that broke out in Istanbul in June 
2013 and spread across the nation, there was active participation from the 
neighborhoods populated by Ja’faris, particularly from Halkalı61. As a result 
of the occasionally violent interventions of law enforcers to suppress 
peaceful demonstrations, 8 Alawi youth lost their lives and more than 7.000 
demonstrators were wounded, 100 of which were severe cases. Participation 
in the civilian protest that enjoyed the highest level of participation in the 
history of Turkey represented an important experience for the 
democratization of the Ja’fari community who had always sided with the 
official law enforcement throughout its political history. As Ja’faris raised 
their voice against the government and its discriminatory policies that had 
been in place since the foundation of the Republic, there were official 
                                                          
60 The first time Ja’faris were recognized at the state level according to Zarcone (2007) was 
the invitation of Selahattin Özgündüz to the fast-breaking meal in 1997organized by the then 
Sunni Islamist Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan of the Welfare Party of which Tayyip 
Erdoğan was also a member. 
61 Özgündüz who visited the protesters at Gezi Park (the heart of the protests) could not 
enter the area due to forced polic evacuation at the time of his visit. (K. Alcan, personal 
communication, 25 July 2014). 
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reports62 that came to light that claimed that Ja’faris were running fifth arm 
activities against Iran as a discriminatory force that posed a threat against the 
nation. 
 For instance, a report issued by the Presidency of the Religious 
Affairs (Bu rapor ortalığı karıştırdı, 2013) shows how the establishment sees 
any sect of Islam but Sunnism as a threat:  
 “Our citizens who are members of the Shi’a do not come to the 
mosques of the Office of the Mufti because of the pressure of 
mullahs. In the future, the discourse and behaviors that encourage 
Shi’ia (Ja’farism) jurisprudence will accelerate ideological 
separation among the youth. Therefore it is deemed very 
important to closely monitor these initiatives that are carried out 
on behalf of religion in religious spheres and that lay the ground 
for negative social structures that threaten our state, nation, and 
integrity”  
 Another significant detail in the report of the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs is the relationship between the religious practices of the followers of 
Shi’ia and Iranians who are of the same sect as well: 
 “They recite their azan, imsak and iftaar prayers only a few 
minutes apart, celebrate their religious holidays in tandem with 
Iran, invite Iranian mullahs as speakers in their religious programs 
regularly. All of these are deemed as acts of fundamentalism or 
encouraging fundamentalism.”  
 The Presidency of Religious Affairs, which reports to the Prime 
Ministry, attempts at homogenizing religion in social life within the scope of 
the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam. It associates all other initiatives with 
treacherous external powers. This attitude engenders reactions from the 
Ja’fari community. In response to the discriminatory practices of the state 
and the government, and being categorized as an internal threat element, 
Ja’faris pursue a defense strategy shaped around their Turkish nationalism 
arguments: 
“All that is being done is an effort for othering us- the pure Turks 
of the Ja’fari jurisprudence. As the main component of the 
Republic of Turkey, we have never betrayed and will never betray 
                                                          
62 An example of a news article in the Turkish media claiming that the Turkish Azeris spied 
against Iran:  “They accessed the statements of the spies of the Iranian intelligence agency 
Savama who got caught in Iğdır (…)  The informants are generally selected from among 
Ja’faris living in Iğdır and its vicinity. It is reported that this preference stems from the 
sectarian ties between the Iranians and Ja’faris. It is reported that Iran gathers spies from 
Turkish citizens who go to Iran’s Kum city for training...” (İran’ın derin Türkiye Oyunu, 
2012). 
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our land or nation…”(Veli Beder, President of Iğdır Ahlul Bayt 
Association, 2013) 
 The eminent figures of Ja’fari organizations address the collective 
memory that constitutes the collective identity of the Turkish society in 
defining the “real” internal and external enemies of the nation. They depict 
themselves as the “main” and “legitimate” components of the nation as 
Turks and Muslims: 
“We are Turks, and just like our ancestors who refused to give 
away one piece of gravel to the Armenians, we will not give away 
a single piece of gravel to Al Qaeda, Al Nusra or their supporters 
who behead people, eat their livers, massacre women and 
children.” (Veli Beder, President of Iğdır Ahlul Bayt Association, 
2013) 
 Particularly in the first two terms of JDP, the Turkish nationalism 
argument played a major role in curbing the military and bureaucratic 
tutelage that was supported by a nationalist/secular discourse. However, in 
today’s Turkey where social movements have ascended in importance, the 
Turkish nationalism discourse alone is not sufficient for the social legitimacy 
of an identity movement. The social restraints, and the internal 
transformation that the community has undergone from time to time, have 
led Ja’faris to include the concepts of equality, rights, and freedoms to their 
nationalist discourse in areas that they deem problematic for themselves. For 
example, Beder, the President of Iğdır Ahl Bayt Association, who defended 
against the report of the office of mufti using nationalistic arguments, 
demanded the democratization of the Presidency of the Religious Affairs by 
inviting them to offer equal services to all citizens as an organization that is 
financed with the taxes collected from all citizens. Using nationalistic and 
even racist arguments throughout, Beder concluded his speech by saying, 
“the Presidency of Religious Affairs should be restructured, and societies 
and individuals of all faiths should be represented equally, fairly and freely".  
 
INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION: THE PATHWAY OF IDENTITY 
FROM SYMBOLIC TO PHYSICAL VIOLENCE 
 The leadership of Turkey’s Ja’faris have been describing the “the 
shock they’ve experienced” regarding the change of “attitude”63 and 
“discourse”64 they have been subject to after the changes in internal politics 
                                                          
63 For example, while Selim I ordered death penalty for 10.000s of Shi’ites in Anatolia,  the 
3rd Bosporus bridge under construction is named after him.  
64 For example, as Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan targeted the Gülen Community, he made 
hurtful comments about Shi’ites: "They have three character traits: Hypocrisy, lies, and 
slander; and as a result of these three traits, they engage in plots to instigate disorder. They 
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and particularly in foreign politics since 2011 (K. Alcan, personal 
communication, 25 July 2014). 2014 was a turning point for Ja’faris who had 
only been subject to symbolic violence in the political arena, differently from 
the Sunni and Shi’ites in the Middle East. The arson of 2 Ja’fari mosques 
consecutively in Istanbul may be perceived as the first signals of physical 
violence. President of the World Ja’fari Scholars Association, Hasan 
Karabulut voices his assumptions with respect to the new term as follows: 
“There will be similar incidents from now on. As the state pursues such 
politics, and as we keep quite and refuse to be provoked by such games, they 
will continue to give us a hard time.” (Ünal and Akın, 2014).  
 An important question ahead of us pertains to the reaction of Ja’faris 
to state policies, and specifically to government policies, and the identity 
they will define themselves with in Turkish society as an outcome of this 
reaction. Similar to other societies, Turkish society is a living organism that 
is composed of diverse ethnic, religious, sectarian and class layers. Within 
this structure, the Turkish-Muslim-Sunni and Hanafi identity make up the 
quantitative and political majority. They accept other social structures that 
try to integrate with the society on condition that they demonstrate the will to 
assimilate. Those who seek an equal presence and an acknowledging of their 
differences within this organism are faced with resistance and exclusion. 
However, the parts that make up a whole can handle pressure only up to a 
certain limit. Societies redefine their limits to be able to sustain their 
existence. They either tone down their differences to better integrate with the 
whole, or assimilate, or separate from the whole by accentuating their 
differences.  
 Since the foundation of the Republic, Ja’faris have emphasized their 
Muslim (without a focus on the sect) and Turkish identity, trying to be part 
of the integrated whole. Despite such discourse, they were denied access to 
certain fundamental citizenship rights. Recently, Ja’faris have included an 
emphasis on equal citizenship to their discourse.  
 In today’s Turkey, the language that dominates domestic and foreign 
politics is built around a focus on Islamic brotherhood (Sunni) and Muslim 
identity rather than on being Turkish or pro-Turkish. This change of 
discourse at the state level has the potential to further jeopardize the social 
integration of Ja’faris as citizens. Although Iraq’s historic, social, political, 
and demographic structure is very different from Turkey, seeing how the 
change in the discourse of political authority influences Shi’ites may give an 
idea about the future of Turkey. During the Iran-Iraq war, Iraqi Shi’ites were 
viewed skeptically by the Baas regime, and their leaders were murdered. Yet 
                                                                                                                                                     
are worse than the Shi’ia. The Shi’ia can’t beat them in those areas. The same is true for 
telling lies.” (Başbakanın canlı yayın açıklamaları, 2014) 
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they remained loyal to their country on the basis of the Arabic nationalism 
discourse. However, after the first Gulf War, they were completely expelled 
from the system through the discourse and practices of Saddam Hussein that 
shifted from Arabic nationalism to Islamic nationalism (Luomi, 2008, 10). 
Eventually, they rebelled in the south regions of Turkey where they 
constituted the majority, and around 60.000 of them were killed (Pollack, 
2002). Surely, a direct comparison between Turkey and Saddam Hussein’s 
Iraq would be wrong. Despite all the setbacks, Turkey has a rooted and ever-
developing democracy experience that dates back to a considerably long time 
ago. The homogenization policies that have been implemented since 1920’s 
with a view to prevent social conflicts and enable integration were a failure. 
This has been acknowledged by both the ruling and oppositional political 
parties who have repeatedly voiced the need for legal and social reforms in 
recent years. Giving equal rights to all citizens on a Constitutional basis 
regardless of their ethnicity, religion or sectarian differences, and the 
creation of such discourse and services by the public authority, serves as the 
most prominent tool to prevent separation and conflicts that arise from the 
differences within the Turkish society. Unless the social and political 
dynamics in Turkey take a sufficient or timely step towards democratization, 
as in the case of other “minorities”, Ja’faris’ desire for belonging of 
citizenship and social integration may potentially weaken. 
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